It is now well documented that women in market economies experience a wage penalty for motherhood. How does motherhood affect women's wages in transition countries? In this paper we investigate the motherhood wage penalty in post-reform urban China, using data from the China's Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS). The survey provides a national representative panel sample for the period from 1990 to 2005. Applying panel-estimation techniques, we examine how economic transition has affected the wage gap between mothers and women without children.
Introduction
It is well recognized that women's reproductive activities, typically child bearing and rearing, are crucial for human capabilities and well-being; caring for children, through its contribution to human and social capital formation, also play a pivotal role in generating and sustaining economic growth (Folbre and Nelson 2000). However, economic institutions often fail to recognize the contribution of women's reproductive activities. Instead, women's child bearing and rearing role disadvantages them in the labor market, and is a major factor feeding into their weak position in occupations and earnings (Elson 1999). Many empirical analyses for industrialized countries find that mothers earn less than women without children. 1 Feminist economists call the wage losses associated with motherhood the motherhood wage penalty (Budig and England, 2001 ).
The motherhood wage penalty can be attributed to various factors. First, in the absence of labor market regulations on maternity/parental leave, child bearing and rearing interrupt women's labor force participation, and women' intermittent labor force participation reduces their human capital investment (Mincer and Polachek, 1974 ; Jones and Makepeace, 1996; Royalty 1998). Second, child rearing often restricts mothers to types of paid work that are easier to combine with parenting─for example, part-time work and home-based work (Becker 1991; Polachek, 1980) . Third, mothers may earn less because effort extended to child rearing inevitably reduces the amount of effort available for paid work (Becker 1991; Albrecht et al. 1999; Anderson et al. 2002) . Finally, believing that mothers always allow domestic responsibilities to interrupt their paid work, employers may discriminate against mothers in hiring and promotion (Waldfogel, 1998b) . The earnings losses associated with motherhood are an important source of gender earnings inequality.
In this paper we investigate the motherhood wage penalty in urban China. Over the past three decades the Chinese economy has undergone a transition from a centrally planned to a market economy. The economic transition has brought about fundamental changes to the labor market, reshaping the ways by which society values and rewards women's reproductive activities. A large body of studies has emerged examining the impacts of economic transition on women's labor market outcomes.
However, most of the studies focus on such factors as human capital investment, sex segregation, and discrimination and pay little attention to the changes associated with women's reproductive activities. In this paper we examine how economic transition has affected the wage gap between mothers and women without children. To our knowledge, the present paper is the first analysis of the motherhood wage penalty for a transition country.
Our analysis is based on data from the China's Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS). The survey provides a national representative panel sample for the period from 1990 to 2005. Thus, we are able to control for unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity among women which may bias the estimates for the motherhood effect in cross-section analyses. We first compare the wage patterns between the two periods:
the gradualist reform period from 1990 to 1996 and the radical reform period from 1999 to 2005. We find that while there is no negative effect of motherhood on annual wages and nor on hourly wages for the gradualist reform period, motherhood imposes substantial wage losses (39% of decrease in annual wages and 41% of decrease in hourly wages) for the radical reform period. We next explore the contrast between the state sector and the non-state sector. We find that motherhood has no significant negative effect on wages by any measure in the state sector; however, mothers in the non-state sector are punished severely, especially in the radical reform period. These results suggest that economic transition has increased the costs of child rearing that are borne disproportionately by mothers. Thus, our analysis sheds new light on the gender implications of economic transition and contributes to the broader literature on work-family conflicts and child-related public policies.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of economic transition and discusses the reasons as to why economic transition may increase the wage penalty for motherhood. Section 3 introduces empirical methodologies and discusses the estimated issues. Section 4 describes the data. The empirical results are presented in Section 5. The paper is concluded with a summary of the main findings and a brief discussion of policy implications.
Economic Transition and the Wage Penalty for Motherhood
Under central planning, China's urban labor market was known as an -iron rice bowl‖ and -everyone eating from one big pot‖. Workers in state enterprises were employed for life and paid according to centrally regulated wage scales which were determined predominantly on the basis of workers' education and seniority (Korzec, 1992) . Inspired by the Marxist doctrine that women's emancipation is contingent on women's participation in socialized labor, women's full participation in the labor force played a key role in the leadership's attempt to alleviate discrimination against women (Croll 1983). Most working-age women were employed on a full-time basis. To support working mothers, resources were devoted to a publicly funded childcare system which provided care to children from the earliest months of their lives until they entered primary schools. In addition to on-site childcare, the employers also provided working mothers with nursing rooms for breast-feeding and paid maternity /family leaves. These family friendly policies made it easier for mothers to combine paid work with domestic responsibilities, thereby minimizing the interruption of child bearing and rearing on women's workforce participation. While women remained the principal caregivers for children and other family members and their domestic burdens may leave them exhausted or distracted at work, the impact of work effort on earnings was limited because the wage differentials among workers were compressed.
Given the institutional characteristics of the labor regime, the wage penalty for motherhood should be small or nonexistent under central planning.
In the late 1970s, China started the transition to a market-oriented economy with a gradualist approach. In the first fifteen years of reforms, the Chinese government sought reform within the socialist system, directing their efforts primarily to economic decentralization, improving the incentives of state workers and managers, and encouraging the development of non-state sectors. While the entry of rural township village enterprises (TVEs), private firms, and foreign invested firms markedly eroded the share of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in product markets, the public sector remained the principal employers of urban workers, accounting for more than three-quarters of total urban employment by 1995. State enterprises continued to
protect workers against open unemployment and shoulder the responsibility of providing social benefits and services to employees. Among transition economies, China's reforms are seen as highly successful in producing impressive rates of economic growth and reducing income poverty.
However, an unintended consequence of the SOE-sector restructuring is the dismantling of the institutional mechanism that internalized the costs of reproduction, 
Hypothesis and Empirical Methodology
In the remainder of the paper, we investigate the impact of economic transition on the motherhood wage penalty by exploring the differences between two phases of economic transition: the gradualist reform period (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) The motherhood dummy variable mother it is the principal independent variable of the wage equation. Defined based on the first alive birth a woman gave, mother it is an aggregate measure for motherhood, for all women who have had child bearing and 2 The state sector includes government offices, public institutions such as schools and hospitals, and SOEs, while the non-state sector consists of urban collectives, private firms, foreign joint ventures and foreign firms. We divide the urban market into the state versus non-state sectors instead of the public versus private sectors because urban collectives that operate primarily in the competitive sectors and are fully responsible for their profits and losses behave more similar to private firms than SOEs.
rearing experience, regardless of what age their children were or how many children they had at the time the survey was done. Our measure for motherhood takes into account not only the direct effect of having and raising young children but also its effect felt in the later years of a mother's career. While the adverse effect of motherhood on a woman's paid work may be lessened or disappear as children grow up, its effect on earnings is long lasting, given that workforce interruption, missed on-job training opportunities or delayed promotion in the early years of career lower one's earnings in the later years, other things being equal. We do not control for the number of children because the vast majority of women in the sample, especially those in the later periods, have only one child due to China's only-child policy introduced in the late 1970s. 3 Thus, the coefficient on the motherhood dummy variable β 2 measures the average effect of motherhood on a woman's life-time earnings. If motherhood has a negative effect on wages, we expect .
The covariates in X include personal characteristics such as education attainments, potential work experience and its squared term, and marital status, and job characteristics such as job status (full-time versus part-time), occupation, and ownership of one's employers. We also control for co-residence with old parents.
Under the influence of traditional culture, living with parents or parents-in-law is a common phenomenon in Chinese families. Living with old parents may have two opposing effects on earnings. On the one hand, parents may help women take care of children and alleviate their domestic work burden, thereby having a positive impact on women's earnings. On the other hand, parents may need to be taken care of by their daughters or daughters-in law and increase their domestic burden, so there may be a negative impact on women's earnings. In addition, the covariate control variables also include dummy variables for time and regional variation.
Equation (1) is estimated as both random-effects and fixed-effects models.
Empirically, random-effects and fixed-effects estimates are both consistent but only random-effects estimates are efficient if the unobserved individual effects v i are uncorrelated with any explanatory variable including mother it . But only fixed-effects estimates are consistent if v i is correlated any explanatory variable. For all models, the Hausman test was conducted to assess which model is adequate. 
Data and Variables
This research is based on data from the six waves (1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004 and 2006) of the CHNS. 5 Each survey covers about 3,800 households and about 14,000 individuals in both rural and urban areas from nine provinces, namely, Heilongjiang, Liaoning, Shandong, Henan, Jiangsu, Hubei, Hunan, Guizhou, and
Guangxi. We restrict our analysis to women of prime age (between 17 and 45 years)
in the urban sector which includes communities in cities and county centers and excludes villages suburban and rural areas. 6 We further limit the sample to women employed part-time or full-time during at least two of the six waves since fixed-effects models require at least two observations on each person. After deletions of person-years with missing values on one or more variables, the sample for analysis 4 We do not perform Heckman-type selectivity corrections to the wage equation. However, if women for whom the motherhood penalty would be larger are more likely to remain out of the labor force, our estimates will understate the motherhood penalty. 5 The CHNS is jointly sponsored by the Carolina Population Center at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, the Institute of Nutrition and Food Hygiene of China and the Chinese Academy of Preventive Medicine. Detailed information about the CHNS is available at the website www.cpc.unc.edu/china/home.html. So far the CHNS has collected data for 1989, 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004 and 2006 . The data collected in 1989 are excluded from the analysis because the information on some variables in that year is incompatible to the information gathered in the following six periods. 6 Our analysis is confined to the urban sector because as a developing country the institutional features of the urban and rural labor markets in China are markedly different. Wage employment is not a major form of employment for married women in rural areas as most of them work primarily on family farms.
consists of 2,233 observations, and mothers account for 75 percent of the sample.
We construct two measures for the dependent variable: annual wage and hourly wage the respondent earned in the last year prior to the time the survey was conducted.
The annual wage includes both regular wages and bonuses measured in The mean values of annual and hourly wages in log form by period and by sector presented in Table 1 provide a broad picture of the changing motherhood wage penalty over the sample period. From that table, we note that the annual and hourly wages of women without children are lower than that for mothers. This is not surprising because wages are determined not only by child bearing status but also by education and experience, and childless women are, on average, much younger than mothers in the sample and therefore have less work experience. However, from the early reform period (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) to the later period (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) , the wage differentials between mothers and women without children are significantly decreased, indicating that during the radical reform period, the wages of women without children grew faster than those of mothers. The similar patterns of change are also observed when comparing the state and non-state sectors. In the state sector, the annual and hourly wages of women without children are markedly lower than those of mothers;
but in the non-state sector, the wage gaps are much smaller. The contrast between the two sectors suggests that holding constant experience, the negative effect of motherhood on wages would be greater for the non-state sector than the state sector.
Empirical results
The regression equation in (1) Hausman test result in each regression indicates that the individual fixed-effects are endogenous, and therefore the fixed effect estimates should be chosen. Turning to the motherhood wage effect, the fixed-effects estimate all has a negative sign and is significant at the 5% level for annual wages and the 10% level for hourly wages.
Specifically, the estimates of version (1) show that, holding other factors constant, motherhood reduces annual earnings of urban women by 24.6% and hourly earnings by 22.9%. The closeness of the two estimates suggests that the negative effect of motherhood on annual earnings is primarily due its impact on hourly rates not on total labor hour supply. When the "part-time" variable is excluded from the regression (version (2)), the estimate for motherhood effect goes up to 26% for annual wages and down slightly to 21.6% for hourly wages. These results suggest that the increase of part-time employment plays a role for the rising wage penalty for motherhood for annual wages not hourly wages. However, the exclusion of occupational dummy variables (version (3)) does not lead to any appreciable change to the estimate.
The results of other control variables are all consistent with economic intuitions.
The estimates for educational attainment variables show that education has significant positive effect on earnings; for instance, women with a university degree earn about 47% to 54% more than women who did not graduate from high school. The two variables for experience are both highly significant, showing that earnings increases with experience but at a decreasing rate. The coefficients on marital status are not significant, indicating that marriage has no effect on earnings. Interestingly, the estimates for co-residence show that living with father or father-in-law has a significant negative effect on women's annual and hourly wages as well, whereas living with mother or mother-in-law has a significant positive effect on women's hourly earnings. These results seem suggesting that co-residence with fathers or fathers-in-law adds work burdens to women, while living with mothers or mothers-in-law helps reduce women's domestic burdens. l difference and the variation over time of the aggregate income. The comparison bases of province and time trend dummy variables are Liaoning Province and year 1991 separately.
The estimation results of the planned economy period (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) are reported in Table 3 in which the explanatory variables included are exactly the same as in Table   2 . Referring to annual earnings, there is no significant impact of motherhood on annual earnings of women either in random effect model or fixed effect model.
Referring to hourly earnings, only in the fixed effect model excluding occupation variables, there is significant negative effect of motherhood on hourly earnings of women. However, the result of Hausman test rejects that fixed effect model. Overall, therefore, motherhood affects significantly neither annual earnings nor hourly earnings of women in urban China in the planned economy era, which indicates that there is not "motherhood penalty" in the planned economy period.
The estimation results of the market economy period (1999-2005) are reported in Table 4 in which the explanatory variables included are also exactly the same as in Table 2 . Similarly to Table 2 , Hausman test results show that the model is suffering from endogeneity problem and the fixed effect estimates should be chosen. When including all the control variables in column (1), motherhood leads to 39% reduction of annual income and 41.7% reduction of hourly earnings of urban women. These decreases of -motherhood penalty‖ are far greater than in Table 2 . Furthermore, the decline range of hourly earnings has increased remarkably, indicating that the -motherhood penalty‖ in market economy period is much more evident than in the whole sample period. Moreover, combined with the results in Table 3 that there is no distinct evidence of -motherhood penalty‖ in the planned economy period, we can draw a conclusion that: the -motherhood penalty‖ of Chinese woman exists only in the market economy period, so it is an outcome of economic transition. When ). However, one of the characteristics of the transition economies is exactly sector transfer from this kind of "family-friendly" sectors to "family unfriendly" sectors. Specifically, the proportion of public economy keeps decreasing, while the proportion of non-public economy has been increasing. Yet in non-public economy sectors there is more absence of protection to women in aspiring efficiency.
In order to examine whether the changes of ownership (sector) is a causation of "motherhood penalty" more formally, we introduce the public sector dummy variable as well as the interaction term of the public sector and motherhood dummy to the model, so that to analyze the different features of -motherhood penalty‖ in public sector and non-public sector. The results are reported in Table 5 .
As is shown in table 5, there are no distinct differentials of the effect of motherhood on annual income and hourly earnings of urban women between the public sector and the non-public sector in the planned economy era, regardless of random effect or fixed effect model. However, in the market economy period, both the annual income and hourly earnings of mothers working in the public sector are remarkably higher than those in the non-public sector, of which annual income is 45.4% higher and hourly earnings is 40.9% higher. This suggests that -motherhood penalty‖ in the non-public sector is much greater than in the public sector.
All of our findings propose that the -motherhood penalty‖ of Chinese urban women is largely due to economic transition. Economic transition has caused increasing competition and mobility in labor market, increasingly flexible employment forms, more non-public economy proportion as well as social security insufficiency. Therefore, the "motherhood penalty" is closely related to women's choice of employment forms, occupation and working sectors. In the market economy system, forced by the pressure of competition, mothers more tend to choose part-time work, low-income occupations and non-public sector, which directly lead to the decline of their annual income and hourly earnings, so as to provide a new interpretation of -motherhood penalty‖.
Conclusion and policy implication
In this paper, we study the characteristics and the resulting special reasons of 
